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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3553 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES A. WEBSTER, JR., 
        Appellant 
__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00115) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 27, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Charles Webster, Jr. appeals from an order of the District Court denying 
his Rule 33 motion for a new trial.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 On August 23, 2007, while Webster was on intensive probation requiring strict 
supervision, probation officers and others went to the residence he shared with his father, 
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Charles Webster, Sr., to conduct an administrative search.  After placing Webster under 
arrest, the officers conducted the search and discovered two firearms, a Ruger handgun 
found inside a boot in the hall closet and a Taurus handgun found hidden in the living 
room couch.  Webster was indicted on two counts of possession of a firearm by a 
prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  He 
moved for suppression of the firearms.  A hearing was held on the motion, and the 
District Court denied it. 
At the start of Webster’s trial, an issue arose concerning whether his father would 
be called as a witness.  The Government was considering calling him to testify, as he had 
before the grand jury, that he did not own any guns or have any knowledge of guns in his 
apartment.  Webster, on the other hand, wanted to call his father to support his theory that 
the guns belonged to, and were solely possessed by, his father.  Webster, Sr.’s attorney 
informed both parties that Webster, Sr. would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege if 
either party called him as a witness.  During a proffer taken outside of the jury’s presence 
later that day, Webster, Sr. testified that he intended to assert his Fifth Amendment right 
not to answer any questions about the guns found in the apartment or his prior testimony 
regarding the guns. 
Despite the absence of his father’s testimony, Webster built his defense on the 
theory that the guns belonged to his relatives, including his father.  For example, his 
counsel sought to and was able to establish through the Government’s witnesses that it 
was Webster, Sr. who was sitting on the couch right where the Taurus handgun was 
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concealed.1
Webster appealed, contending that:  (1) the District Court improperly admitted the 
firearms found during a search of his apartment; (2) the jury’s verdict was not supported 
by sufficient evidence of constructive possession of the Ruger firearm; and (3) the 
District Court erred in not granting a new trial based on improper comments made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument.  We determined that these contentions were lacking 
in merit and affirmed.  See United States v. Webster, 400 Fed. Appx. 666 (3d Cir. 2010).  
With respect to the constructive possession issue, we explained: 
  A jury found Webster not guilty on the count involving the Taurus handgun 
hidden in the couch, but guilty on the count involving the Ruger handgun that was hidden 
in the boot.  Webster was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 188 months, and three 
years of supervised release. 
We find that a reasonable jury could conclude based on the evidence that 
Webster knowingly had the power and intent to exercise dominion and 
control over the firearm.  The record establishes the following evidence that 
the jury could have considered to support its verdict that Webster 
constructively possessed the firearm:  Webster lived in the apartment where 
the firearm was found; Webster had full and unfettered access to the small 
apartment, including the common area that contained the unlocked hallway 
closet where the firearm was found; the apartment had recently been 
robbed, which a reasonable jury could infer provided Webster with a 
motive to get a gun to protect himself; Webster lived in the apartment at the 
time it was robbed and was familiar with the various items stolen during the 
robbery, which could lead a reasonable jury to infer that Webster was 
familiar with the contents of the apartment; and Webster admitted knowing 
that his father, who also lived in the apartment, had a firearm in the 
apartment similar in description to the one found in the apartment. 
                                              
1 Both guns were stolen; a trace on the firearms revealed that no member of the 
Webster family was the record owner. 
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Id. at 668-69. 
On December 6, 2011, Webster moved pro se for a new trial pursuant to criminal 
Rule 33(b)(1), claiming newly discovered evidence.  The evidence Webster submitted in 
support was an undated statement signed by his father in which his father claimed that he 
owned the guns found during the August 23, 2007 search, and that he was the only person 
with knowledge that the guns were in the apartment.  The statement in its entirety is: 
I, Charles Webster, Sr., would like to state that they were my guns, and the 
only one who knew they were there at that present day and time was me on 
August 23, 2007 all by myself.  See, I had brought them back into the 
apartment earlier that day for my own personal reasons and nobody knew 
of any of it.  I should’ve come forward a long time ago but I was afraid.  
So, I’m saying sorry for this big inconvenience, but this horrible truth has 
to finally come out. 
 
Supp. App. 13. 
 
After the Government responded to the Rule 33 motion, the District Court, in an 
order entered on August 20, 2012, denied it.  The court determined that the evidence was 
not new in that the information was known to Webster at the time of trial, and, under 
those circumstances, although the evidence was newly “available,” it did not satisfy the 
newly “discovered” test for granting a Rule 33 motion.  The court also determined that 
the newly proffered evidence in any event probably would not have produced an 
acquittal. 
Webster appeals pro se.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A District 
Court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 is reviewed for 
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an abuse of discretion.  See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  In his brief on appeal, Webster argues that his father’s newly proffered 
statement was sufficient to support reversal of his conviction, there was no evidence that 
he was previously aware of the presence of the Ruger in the closet, and there was 
insufficient evidence of constructive possession.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 7.  He argues 
that the District Court impeded his ability at trial to show that the guns were solely in the 
possession of his father, see id. at 10, and he further argues that the District Court’s Rule 
33 determination that his father’s new statement lacked credibility is flawed because it is 
equally likely that his father lied to the grand jury but is now telling the truth, see id. at 
12.  Webster also points out that the Government failed to produce any fingerprint 
evidence or any witness who could link him to the Ruger.  See id. 
 We will affirm.  Rule 33(b)(2) provides that a motion for a new trial may be 
brought up to three years after the verdict if the motion is grounded upon newly 
discovered evidence.  Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33(b)(2).  In order to grant a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, the District Court must find that the following five 
requirements have been met:  (a) the evidence must have been discovered since the trial; 
(b) facts must be alleged from which diligence on the part of the movant may be inferred; 
(c) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) the evidence must be 
material; and (e) the evidence must be of such nature that in a new trial it would probably 
produce an acquittal.  See United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976).  
The burden of proving each of the elements is on the movant.  See United States v. 
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Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006)).  If any one of the five elements is not 
satisfied, the Rule 33 motion must be denied.  See United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 
365 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 We agree with the District Court that the information contained in Webster’s 
father’s newly proffered statement – that the Ruger was his and that he alone possessed it 
– is not newly discovered evidence.  This information was known to Webster at the time 
of trial, and explains why he sought to call his father in support of his defense.  In 
addition, the record shows that Webster claimed, in a videotaped interview which was 
shown to the jury, that his father owned a gun that fit the description of the Ruger and 
that his father kept the gun in the apartment.  See United States v. Bujese, 371 F.2d 120, 
125 (3d Cir. 1967) (evidence is not newly discovered when it was known or could have 
been known through the exercise of diligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel). 
Moreover, the fact that Webster’s father, who invoked his Fifth Amendment right 
at trial, is now willing to testify does not make his newly proffered statement “newly 
discovered” evidence within the meaning of Rule 33.  In Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, we held 
that evidence known but unavailable at trial because a Fifth Amendment privilege was 
invoked is not “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 33.  As in Jasin, 
Webster knew at the time of trial the facts that he seeks to prove in a new trial through his 
father’s newly proffered testimony.  See id. at 362-63.  The jury watched Webster state in 
his videotaped interview that the gun had “been there;” that it was “like an old revolver 
type, big ugly, old thing;” and that it was “[b]rown, beige, or black.”  N.T., 12/08/08, at 
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108-09.  There is nothing in the record to establish that Webster and his counsel were 
either subjectively unaware that both guns belonged to Webster’s father, or that, as an 
objective matter, such evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
diligence before the close of trial.  See Cimera, 459 F.3d at 461.  Webster’s contention 
that he was impeded by the trial court in pursuing his defense that the guns were solely in 
the possession of others is meritless.  See, e.g., N.T., 12/08/08, at 133-34; N.T., 12/09/08, 
at 26-27, 32, 35-36. 
 Because Webster cannot satisfy Ianelli’s first requirement that the newly proffered 
evidence be newly discovered, the District Court’s order denying the Rule 33 motion will 
be affirmed.  See Jasin, 280 F.3d at 365.  We would add, however, that we agree with the 
District Court that the proffered evidence would probably not produce an acquittal, and 
thus there was a second basis for denying the Rule 33 motion.  The District Court is 
required to determine whether the proffered new evidence is credible, United States v. 
Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 189 (3d Cir. 2008); that is, the District Court must determine 
whether a jury at a second trial would likely believe the proffered evidence, see id.  In 
making this determination, the court must weigh the proffered evidence against all of the 
other evidence in the record.  See id. 
The District Court in Webster’s case properly determined that several things 
weighed against a finding of credibility, including that the newly proffered evidence was 
a direct contradiction of Webster, Sr.’s sworn testimony before a grand jury and Webster, 
Sr. could thus be impeached on this basis; that it contained information that Webster, Sr. 
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could not have known with any certainty (that no one else knew he had guns in the 
apartment on that day); and that Webster, Sr. likely was biased in favor of his son and 
would want to see him exonerated.  In addition, we note that there would still be the 
considerable evidence of constructive possession described in our opinion affirming the 
criminal judgment, see Webster, 400 Fed. Appx. at 668-69.  Accordingly, in light of the 
complete evidentiary record and the inconsistency between Webster’s father’s sworn 
grand jury testimony and his newly proffered statement, Webster did not meet his burden 
to show that the newly proffered statement probably would result in his acquittal in a new 
trial. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Webster’s Rule 33 motion.  The Government’s motion to lodge under seal the Sealed 
Supplemental Appendix containing the grand jury testimony of Charles A. Webster, Sr. is 
granted.2
                                              
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the grand jury transcript 
was filed as a sealed exhibit to the Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Webster’s Rule 33 motion.  Local Appellate Rule 30.3(b) directs that any exhibit filed 
under seal in the District Court and not unsealed by order of this Court shall be filed “in a 
separate sealed envelope.” 
 
